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Mechanisms of Vietnam’s Multidirectional 
Foreign Policy 
Nicholas Chapman 
Abstract: It has been nearly 30 years since Vietnam shifted to a multidi-
rectional foreign policy that places greater emphasis on cultivating 
friends and engaging with the international community. Vietnam has 
moved from being an isolated country, largely dependent on Soviet aid, 
to a country that bolsters its standing in bilateral and multilateral forums 
whilst reaping the economic benefits of greater integration into the glob-
al economy. Since the start of the 21st century, China’s more assertive 
posture, along with an increasingly complex, interdependent and multi-
polar world, has provided Vietnam with a host of problems. This article 
formulates a definition for a multidirectional foreign policy using Vi-
etnam as a case study and argues that multidirectionalism allows Vietnam 
to reap economic benefits whilst safeguarding against uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, the article tracks the three principal mechanisms through 
which Vietnam implements its multidirectional foreign policy: strategic 
and comprehensive partnerships, trade agreements, and multilateralism. 
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Introduction 
Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy has its origins in Doi Moi, the 
economic reforms brought about at the 1986 Sixth Party Congress. After 
10 years of economic mismanagement, along with international isolation 
due to the conflict with Cambodia, the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP) faced the prospect of “reform or die” (Turley 1993).1 It, of course, 
chose the former and initiated Doi Moi. At this pivotal juncture, the 
VCP shifted its priorities from military strength to economic develop-
ment and diplomacy. Politburo Resolution 32 in July 1986 called for 
Vietnam to create favourable conditions for economic development, 
which included “peaceful coexistence” with China, the United States, 
and ASEAN (Elliot 2012). This required a peaceful solution to the Cam-
bodian crisis and steps to end Vietnam’s isolation. Subsequently, the 
politburo issued Resolution 13 in 1988, which called for the adoption of 
a multidirectional foreign policy focused on economic development and 
creating “more friends and less enemies” (Thayer 2016c). The Seventh 
Party Congress in 1991 fully adopted this multidirectional foreign policy, 
which called for the diversification and multilateralisation of Vietnam’s 
relations with countries and international organisations alike (The Com-
munist Party of Vietnam 1991).  
As a result, Vietnam significantly bolstered its diplomatic relations, 
moving from having diplomatic relations with just 23 countries in 1985 
to 163 by 1995. It momentously joined the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) in 1998, and applied for World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership in 2001. Because of its increased integration into the inter-
national community, Vietnam has undergone an economic transfor-
mation that has seen consecutive years of high economic growth (ap-
proximately 6 per cent), an impressive reduction in poverty, and much-
improved living standards. At the time of the Ninth Party Congress in 
2001, the VCP elevated Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy and 
placed greater emphasis on “proactive integration into international and 
regional economies in order to maximise the country’s strength, auton-
omy, raise international cooperation and safeguard national interest” 
(The Communist Party of Vietnam 2001).  
The added importance of its foreign policy also coincided with Vi-
etnam’s recognition of the profound changes on-going in the interna-
                                                 
1  This phrase was first uttered by Secretary General Nguyen Van Linh and has 
often been used since to emphasise the continued need for reform.  
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tional system. In July 2003, the Eighth Central Committee issued Resolu-
tion 8, which diverged from Vietnam’s traditional friends vs enemies 
approach. The concept of partner (doi tac) and opponent (doi tuong) em-
phasised that, within a relationship, areas of cooperation and areas of 
conflict can operate simultaneously. The resolution also called for a flex-
ible approach to relations (Pham 2011). Since then, Vietnam has started 
to recognise the integrated international system with other emergent 
power sources, such as Russia, China and India (Tran 2008). During the 
2006 Tenth Party Congress, Vietnam called for “proactive integration 
into the international economy whilst at the same time expanding inter-
national cooperation into other domains” (The Communist Party of 
Vietnam 2006). The pinnacle of Vietnam’s economic integration came in 
January 2007 when Vietnam became a member of the WTO.  
By this time, multidirectionalism had become a key tool for Vi-
etnam to enhance its economic situation whilst maintaining its sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, autonomy, and independence. The expansion 
into other domains recognised the need for a broader focus that incor-
porated aspects other than just economic ones. Between 2006 and 2011, 
Vietnam took numerous steps to positively engage with the international 
community. It became a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council in 2008, contributed to the building of the ASEAN Community 
and ASEAN Charter, and successfully fulfilled its chairmanship of 
ASEAN and the ASEAN Inter Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA).  
In recognition of Vietnam’s proactive measures, the Eleventh Party 
Congress elevated integration to “proactive and positive international 
integration,” with a key focus on diversity (Nguyen XT 2017). In 2013, 
the politburo issued Resolution 22, which significantly broadened the 
scope of “proactive and positive” integration, focusing not only on the 
economy, but also areas of politics, defence and security, as well as cul-
tural and social fields. Subsequently, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
issued Directive No. 15/CT-TTg, which led to the establishment of a 
National Steering Committee on International Integration. This included 
two inter-agency steering committees; one dealt with integration in poli-
tics, security and national defence, while the other dealt with culture and 
society, science and technology, and education and training (Thayer 
2016b). Ultimately, Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy serves its 
national interest of maintaining a peaceful and stable environment, pro-
tecting national independence and sovereignty and boosting Vietnam’s 
position to bolster national construction and defence.  
But how do we define a multidirectional foreign policy and what 
mechanisms has Vietnam implemented to pursue such a policy since it 
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began promoting a proactive and diverse approach to foreign relations? 
There is little scholarly research that pinpoints a precise meaning of what 
a multidirectional foreign policy entails. In the present article, I will at-
tempt to contribute to the discourse on multidirectionalism as a foreign 
policy by synthesising previous research into the matter and formulating 
a definition using Vietnam as a case study. This could help explain the 
benefits of such a policy and how it fits into Vietnam’s core strategic 
interests outlined above. Similarly, it can be useful for understanding 
potential foreign policy strategies for other states seeking to preserve 
their autonomy, maximise gains, and minimise loses, particularly vis-à-vis 
asymmetrical relations.  
Ultimately, multidirectionalism is a foreign policy that seeks to di-
versify relationships in order to reap as many political, economic and 
security benefits as possible, all while hedging against potential threats in 
an increasingly integrated, multipolar international order. For Vietnam, 
as a relatively small state with an historically asymmetrical relationship 
with China, a multidirectional foreign policy is favourable as it prevents 
the country from either balancing or bandwagoning with one particular 
state but increases its autonomy and preserves its sovereignty through a 
broad-based hedging strategy. I will then focus on the three mechanisms 
through which Vietnam carries out its multidirectional foreign policy – 
strategic/comprehensive partnerships, trade agreements and multilateral-
ism – and how these three mechanisms allow Vietnam to bolster its 
national construction and hedge against potential threats.  
Multidirectionalism 
Multidirectionalism bears several lexical titles: omni-directionalism, mul-
ti-vectorism, and diversified foreign policies are notable interchangeable 
terms. As is the case with Vietnam, small and medium states are the 
prime adopters of multidirectional foreign policies. Small states frequent-
ly use multidirectional foreign policies when dealing with asymmetrical 
relations. Brantly Womack stated that an asymmetrical relationship is one 
in which a disparity of capabilities exists between two states, leaving the 
weaker side more exposed to the stronger (Womack 2016). At the same 
time, the stronger side is unable to dictate its terms to the smaller state 
since the smaller side dedicates more resources to resisting the larger 
state than the larger state is realistically able to dedicate itself. Small and 
medium-sized states implement multidirectional foreign policies to alle-
viate some of the threats and potential challenges an asymmetrical rela-
tionship may pose. While traditional forms of balancing and bandwagon-
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ing are options, they reduce the states’ autonomy, leading them to in-
stead emphasise diversity and integration within their relationships to 
maximise gains and reduce threats. Thus, states with historical asymmet-
rical relationships are more prone to have multidirectional foreign poli-
cies since this enables them to preserve their autonomy vis-à-vis their 
larger neighbour.  
Another key aspect of multidirectionalism is the evolving nature of 
a multipolar system that differs sharply from the bipolar system of the 
Cold War and unipolar system that followed shortly thereafter. The use 
of force or unilateral action has become increasingly “self-limiting” 
(Womack 2014). Furthermore, economic growth, energy security, and 
environmental sustainability has led to an “interest-based, problem-
driven, and process oriented” interconnected system that creates a great-
er need for cooperation (Grevi 2009). For larger states, this means that 
they find their behaviour increasingly constrained, even though global 
demands are placed on them for greater leadership when dealing with 
global, integrated problems. Meanwhile, for smaller states that had tradi-
tionally been constrained to the sidelines of great-power politics, a mul-
tipolar world has allowed them greater freedoms and platforms to pursue 
foreign policies that bring them the largest amount of political, security 
and economic benefits possible.  
On the other hand, a multipolar world also means that prevailing 
uncertainty is prominent (Kuik 2016). The rise of territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea, as well as across Asia, creates a potential future 
source of conflict. Financial crises such as the 1997 Asian Financial Cri-
sis, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, as well as the 2015 Chinese stock 
market turbulence, highlight the grave economic uncertainties that pose 
a threat to the economic well-being of smaller states. These states are 
less capable of riding out the storm created by such financial restrictions. 
There is also a domestic component to this uncertainty with the rise of 
value/norm-based foreign policies. In particular, the United States and 
the European Union have a strong ability to define norms in the interna-
tional context. Given their economic might, they have considerable lev-
erage in exerting these norms, which can pose a threat to the sovereignty 
of smaller states that are less resistant to such pressures.  
Multidirectionalism can also be a useful policy in pursuing a hedging 
strategy, which is all the more useful in the multipolar world. Hedging is 
a form of alignment behaviour but differs from traditional forms of 
alignment such as balancing or bandwagoning because it allows a state to 
exhibit both forms of “power acceptance” and “power rejection” (Kuik 
2016). In other words, it is a strategy that strikes the middle ground 
  36 Nicholas Chapman 
 
without committing to a larger power. It maximises rewards but miti-
gates risks and uncertainties.  
Given the high stakes and high uncertainty in a multipolar world, 
states involved in asymmetrical relations must attempt to acquire as 
many benefits as possible, while also securing alternatives for worst-case 
scenarios. These policies are often contradictory yet necessary in order to 
present a stance of neutrality to preserve gains and minimise losses. As 
will be demonstrated below, Vietnam has skilfully implemented a series 
of mechanisms that enable it to hedge against potential military, econom-
ic, and political threats. However, it has been skilful at ensuring these 
preventative measures do not inhibit it from gaining from the intercon-
nected, multipolar world. While these mechanisms sometimes appear 
contradictory and wide-ranging, that is precisely what a hedging strategy 
is designed to do: maximise benefits and reduce potential risks. Ultimate-
ly, a multidirectional foreign policy allows for the successful implementa-
tion of a hedging strategy.  
Post-Soviet states such as Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan have all been proponents of “multi-vector” foreign policies. 
These are policies that seek to neither “balance nor bandwagon” (Gne-
dina 2015). Rather, they are tactical manoeuvres that seek to maximise 
wealth whilst maintaining a degree of autonomy and thus enhance their 
own bargaining power. Given post-Soviet states’ preferences to avoid 
becoming over-reliant on Russia, while at the same time maintaining 
cordial relations, they often seek out further partners in order to give 
themselves both greater flexibility in dealings vis-à-vis Russia and to 
attract the economic benefits of major players such as the US, the EU, 
China and Japan. These multi-vector foreign policies are geared towards 
ensuring autonomy and a stable environment that encourages economic 
development. Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev has demon-
strated the use of such a policy by claiming that a multi-vector foreign 
policy develops “predictable and friendly relationships with all countries,” 
creating economic benefits in the process at the same time as minimising 
security threats (Diyarbakirlioglu and Yigit 2014). Similarly, multi-vector 
foreign policies are designed to avoid being engaged in a tug of war be-
tween two powers. 
Thailand is another country that has historically been associated 
with an omni-directional foreign policy. In 1985, then-Foreign Minister 
Siddhi Savetsil outlined Thailand’s new omnidirectional approach to 
foreign relations after a decade of preoccupation with the Indochina 
conflict. Cheow described this foreign policy as a desire to play a more 
active role on the global stage in order to strengthen Thailand’s national 
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and economic security. Thailand sought to strengthen its relations with 
larger powers, prioritise ASEAN, and link foreign policy to economic 
diplomacy (Cheow 1986). This foreign policy offered flexibility that ac-
commodated large powers but also maintained a high degree of autono-
my in the process, and was geared towards economic growth. As such, 
Thailand enjoyed good relations with its neighbours and super-powers 
alike, and reaped considerable economic benefits, at least until the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis (Snitwongse 2001). 
Although Japan’s present-day foreign policy is more prominent and 
proportionate to its economic size, the country has historically engaged 
in what it labelled an “omni-directional foreign policy.” Scholars have 
described Japan’s omni-directional foreign policy during the Fukuda 
Doctrine as a “simplistic policy, which allows economics to be separated 
from politics, when it is to Japan’s advantage, by maintaining friendly 
relations with all” (Khamchoo 1991). Meanwhile, Vietnam’s current 
multidirectional foreign policy has been described as the process of 
forming as many equidistant partners to ensure freedom and protect 
itself from overdependence on one particular power (Do 2014). Matthias 
Maass described Vietnam’s “multi-dimensional foreign policy” as seeking 
to link up with all the great powers and major international organisations 
(Maass 2012).  
Weaving together the above descriptions, we can characterise 
multidirectionalism as a foreign policy in which a state, usually a small or 
medium power, attempts to play a more active role, which encourages 
diversity and pragmatism in its relationships to reap as many economic, 
political and security benefits as possible, at the same time as enhancing 
its bargaining position, notably vis-à-vis asymmetrical relations. This is a 
strategy that maximises gains but also guards against the potential pitfalls 
of uncertainty and future conflict in an increasingly complex, interde-
pendent and multipolar world order. Based on this definition, there are 
considerable benefits in pursuing a multidirectional foreign policy for 
Vietnam. Economic development is paramount for the state as it seeks 
to meet the 2020 development targets it outlined shortly after the 12th 
Party Congress, which include economic growth rates of 6.5–7 per cent, 
a GDP per capita of USD 3,200–3,500, and having 80 per cent of citi-
zens covered by health insurance (Quan Doi Nhan Dan 2016). Economic 
ties are now a focal point of international relations.  
In pursuing a multidirectional foreign policy, Vietnam can draw on 
additional sources of economic growth and avoid becoming overly reli-
ant on a single power for growth. Paramount to promoting sustainable 
economic development, however, is securing peace and stability and 
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ensuring the protection of Vietnam’s national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Given recent events, particularly China’s more assertive postur-
ing in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
have come under threat. By pursuing a diversified foreign policy Vietnam 
can draw on the support of various actors, both large and medium-sized 
powers, in its dispute with China to gain greater leeway. Due to the mas-
sive disparity in size, in addition to the desire to rectify the problem 
peacefully, a diversified approach offers Vietnam greater alternatives in 
quelling the conflict without jeopardising Vietnamese economic and 
political relations with its neighbour to the north. Additionally, Vietnam 
avoids a situation where it becomes sucked into taking sides between an 
increased US–China rivalry. It can pursue a “multipolar balancing strate-
gy” as opposed to a narrower balancing strategy (Thayer 2015b).  
From a security standpoint, increased diversification to foreign rela-
tions fits into Vietnam’s “three nos” approach to defence; that is: “no 
military alignment or alliance with any power, no military bases on Viet-
namese soil, and no reliance upon another country to counter a third 
party” (The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2004).2 Pursuing a diversified 
foreign policy via multilateral institutions, as well as strong bilateral part-
nerships, avoids a situation in which Vietnam is forced to forge a close 
relationship with any one particular power that might bring this policy 
into question. Thus, a multidirectional foreign policy fits into Vietnam’s 
strategic objectives of creating a peaceful, stable environment to bolster 
its standing, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in addition to protecting 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity. I will now turn my attention to 
the three mechanisms by which Vietnam pursues a multidirectional for-
eign policy: strategic partnerships, trade deals, and multilateralism.  
Strategic Partnerships 
Strategic partnerships have proliferated since the turn of the millennium 
and, like multidirectionalism, a multipolar world has been conducive to 
their formation. Strategic partnerships are goal-driven rather than threat-
driven (Wilkins 2011). They are comprehensive agreements that signify a 
long-lasting commitment by two actors to establish a close working rela-
tionship across a significant number of policy areas and do not invoke 
the need for an identified threat (Nadkarni 2010). Similarly, they are a 
bilateral means of deepening cooperation to tackle global problems 
                                                 
2  The three nos were first mentioned in Vietnam’s 1998 White Paper and more 
formally codified in the subsequent 2004 White Paper. 
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stemming from non-traditional security threats and to neutralise poten-
tial conflict areas. Vietnam has targeted strategic/comprehensive part-
nerships as a means to elevate Vietnam’s relations and its standing in the 
international system, while taking advantage of cooperation to bolster 
national defence and construction, maintain peace, stability, and devel-
opment in the world (Pham BM 2014). These efforts are also not antag-
onistic and represent Vietnam’s commitment to peaceful solutions and 
cooperation, while also reflecting the country’s hedging strategy.  
The Vietnamese foreign policy lexicon includes several terms to de-
note the level and the amount of mechanisms to implement their part-
nerships. They are, in rising order of depth: comprehensive partnerships, 
strategic partnerships, extensive strategic partnerships, strategic-compre-
hensive partnerships and comprehensive-strategic cooperative partner-
ships (Thayer 2013). The difference in meaning between partnerships is 
rather blurred and Vietnamese foreign policymakers themselves have yet 
to come up with a clear definition of each (Le 2013). The content of 
each partnership varies, with comprehensive partnerships generally being 
less dense in nature. Since 2001, in coordination with its diverse, inte-
grated, and more proactive foreign policy, Vietnam has established stra-
tegic/comprehensive partnerships with 16 different countries and up-
graded three existing strategic partnerships to extensive strategic partner-
ships or strategic-comprehensive partnerships. These agreements are 
broad, comprehensive agreements that facilitate cooperation across a 
wide array of areas such as economics, politics, diplomacy, defence and 
security, science, and culture.  
Table 1.  Vietnam’s Strategic Partners 
Country Partnership Status Date Agreed 
China Comprehensive-strategic 
cooperative partnership 
2008 (renamed in 2013) 
Russia Comprehensive-strategic- 
partnership 
2001(initially a strategic 
partnership) 2012 
India Strategic-comprehensive 
partnership 
2007 (initially a strategic 
partnership) 2016 
Japan Extensive strategic partner-
ship 
2006 (initially a strategic 
partnership) 2014 
Spain Strategic partnership 2009 
South Korea Strategic partnership 2009 
The United Kingdom Strategic partnership 2010 
Germany Strategic partnership 2011 
Italy Strategic partnership 2013 
France Strategic partnership 2013 
Thailand Strategic partnership 2013 
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Country Partnership Status Date Agreed 
Indonesia Strategic partnership 2013 
Singapore Strategic partnership 2013 
The Philippines Strategic partnership 2015 
Australia Comprehensive partnership 2009 
The United States Comprehensive partnership 2013 
Note:  This table only contains the US and Australia comprehensive partnerships due 
to their strategic significance. The eight remaining comprehensive partners are: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Myanmar, New Zealand, South Africa, 
Ukraine and Venezuela. 
Vietnam currently maintains comprehensive partnerships with 11 coun-
tries, most notably the United States and Australia. Australia initially 
committed to a comprehensive strategic partnership, rejecting the term 
strategic, in 2009. In 2010, a plan of action was agreed upon to provide a 
framework within which cooperation could be identified (Australian 
Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014). Vietnam–
Australia relations failed to take-off after this period until March 2015 
when Nguyen Tan Dung, on a visit to Australia, witnessed the signing of 
a Declaration on Enhancing Australia-Vietnam Comprehensive Partner-
ship. The two countries also expressed their view to establishing a strate-
gic partnership some time in the future.  
The landmark US–Vietnam comprehensive partnership was agreed 
in 2013. The partnership outlines five areas of cooperation: maritime 
capacity building, economic engagement, climate change and environ-
mental issues, education cooperation, and promoting respect for human 
rights. This partnership confirms Vietnam as a geostrategic player in the 
region. Although the partnership also contains a clause on human rights, 
a traditional sticking point of Vietnam–US relations, there was no men-
tion of human rights abuses during Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s 
meeting with US President Donald Trump in May 2017 (Landler 2017).  
Vietnam has entered into strategic partnerships with five different 
European countries. In 2009, after then-President Nguyen Minh Triet’s 
visit, Spain and Vietnam reached an agreement to cooperate with regard 
to politics, economics, culture and education. Although bilateral trade 
between Vietnam and Spain reached USD 2.5 billion in 2014, Spanish 
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ignacio Ybanez Rubio admitted that 
their partnership is yet to reach its full potential (Mussons and Vidaurri 
2016). In 2011, Vietnam established a strategic partnership with Germa-
ny that was designed to strengthen political, economic and cultural 
relations and development cooperation. Since 2013 there has been a 
narrower focus on education and training, energy and the environment 
(Vietnam Breaking News 2015). Vietnam also signed a strategic partnership 
with Italy in 2013 in which the two countries strengthened cooperation 
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in areas of politics, global and regional issues, economic relations, devel-
opment assistance, cultural, education, and scientific and technological 
cooperation, and defence and security (Tuoi Tre 2013).  
Arguably the two most dense and important European strategic 
partnerships are with the United Kingdom and France. Vietnam and the 
UK agreed a strategic partnership in 2010 to cooperate in seven key 
areas: political, global and regional issues, trade and investment, sustain-
able socio-economic development, education and training, science and 
technology, security and defence, and people-to-people links (Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office 2010). Two thousand and fifteen also saw the 
first visit of a British Prime Minister to Vietnam and, in April 2016, Brit-
ish Foreign Minister Phillip Hammond met with his Vietnamese coun-
terpart to discuss greater cooperation in education, including the estab-
lishment of a Vietnam-UK Institute in Da Nang. In June 2016, Minister 
of Defence Earl Howe met with Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi 
Vinh to discuss future defence cooperation (Vietnam Plus 2016c). Fur-
thermore, on a visit to Paris in 2013, Nguyen Tan Dung signed a joint 
statement on a Vietnam–France strategic partnership that aimed to co-
operate in the fields of politics, national defence-security, economics and 
trade, investment, development, culture, education, scientific research, 
and law (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). A state visit by 
French President Francois Hollande in September 2016 reaffirmed the 
two countries’ commitment to strengthen relations and cooperation.  
Vietnam has signed strategic partnerships with four ASEAN part-
ners: Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. The first was 
Thailand in 2013, after Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong established 
a strategic partnership with five main pillars: political relations, defence 
and security cooperation, economic cooperation, social-cultural coopera-
tion, and regional and international cooperation (Vietnam Plus 2013). 
Almost simultaneously, President Truong Tan Sang visited Indonesia to 
establish a strategic partnership. As well as improving cooperation in the 
fields of water, food, and energy security, the partnership aimed to create 
regular opportunities for dialogue exchanges regarding regional security 
issues, namely territorial disputes in the South China Sea (Hoang 2013). 
The fact that Indonesia is not a claimant state, although it has been em-
broiled in disputes with China regarding excursions into its exclusive 
economic zone, bolstered Vietnam’s support for a peaceful resolution to 
the issue. In 2013,  Singapore and Vietnam signed a strategic partnership 
to celebrate the 40th anniversary of diplomatic ties. This strategic part-
nership strengthened cooperation in five key areas: political, economic 
cooperation, security and defence cooperation, bilateral cooperation, and 
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cooperation in bilateral forums (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2013). Vietnam’s latest strategic partnership was signed in November 
2015 with the Philippines, in which the two countries agreed to enhance 
political, economic, defence and security, maritime and ocean affairs, 
scientific and technical, socio-cultural, and multilateral cooperation (Vi-
etnam News 2015b). 
In 2009, Vietnam began a strategic partnership with South Korea 
after then-President Truong Tan Sang’s visit to Seoul. The two countries 
expanded cooperation in politics, science and technology, judicial, eco-
nomics, trade, and security (Korea Times 2016). These relations were fur-
ther strengthened economically when Vietnam and South Korea signed a 
free trade agreement (FTA) that was put into place in December 2015. 
The two countries also established a ministerial-level joint committee 
and subcommittees on goods trades, customs, trade defence, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers to trade (Vietnam 
News 2015a). Japan became the first country to enhance its strategic 
partnership to an extensive strategic partnership. The declaration con-
tains 69 points and seven areas of cooperation that reflect the two coun-
tries’ political trust and deep development of bilateral relations. Building 
on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the Viet-
namese and Japanese defence ministers in 2011, this strategic partnership 
created enhanced areas of exchanges for military and defence personnel 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014).  
Russia was Vietnam’s first strategic partner back in 2001 and in 
2012 the two countries upgraded their relations to that of a comprehen-
sive strategic partnership, focusing on seven areas: oil and gas coopera-
tion, energy cooperation for hydro and nuclear power, military equip-
ment and technology, trade and investment, science and technology, 
education and training, and culture and tourism. Russia’s status as Vi-
etnam’s biggest provider of military equipment and technology has 
helped Vietnam modernise and upgrade its navy and military. Vietnam’s 
first planned Nuclear Power Plant, Ninh Thuan-1, was largely financed 
by Russia and over 300 students studied in Russia in preparation for this 
project. However, the National Assembly ultimately cancelled this plan 
in November 2016, citing economic reasons (Vietnam News 2016). Nev-
ertheless, the close cooperation between Vietnam and Russia signalled 
the depth and degree of cooperative measures in place between the two 
countries. On a brief visit to Hanoi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi met with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc and 
announced the upgrading of the India–Vietnam strategic partnership to 
that of a comprehensive strategic partnership, an arrangement that Vi-
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etnam had previously only held with Russia (Mitra 2014). The visit of 
Modi also involved a USD 500 million line of credit for defence cooper-
ation, providing a boost to Vietnam’s physical military capabilities (Ho 
2016).  
Given the historical and geopolitical significance of China, a strong 
friendship is very important. Therefore, the partnership between the two 
countries was labelled as a comprehensive-strategic cooperative partner-
ship. This partnership was established in 2008 (originally as a strategic 
partnership that was subsequently upgraded a year later to a strategic 
cooperative partnership and then renamed to its current title in 2013) 
and is a “dense network of party, state, defence, and multilateral 
measures” to support this highly valuable, albeit sometimes strained, 
relationship (Thayer 2015a). The Joint Steering Committee that was set 
up by the partnership has met nine times since its inception. This com-
mittee contributes to healthy relations by acting as a platform for con-
sensus on a range of subjects. Similarly, Vietnam and China have con-
ducted an annual Border Defense Friendly Exchange since 2014. Vi-
etnam’s Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh hailed the pro-
gramme on its third border exchange in March 2016, noting its ability to 
“strengthen mutual political trust” (The Voice of Vietnam 2016).  
However, the fourth exchange was abruptly cancelled after territori-
al issues pertaining to the South China Sea were allegedly raised. Accord-
ing to Carl Thayer, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, 
General Fan Changlong asked Vietnamese officials to cease drilling in 
several areas of the South China Sea, leading a Vietnamese official to 
strongly defend Vietnam’s sovereignty (Thayer 2017). As a result, Fan 
left Hanoi and cancelled the meeting. The event led to a highly charged 
diplomatic spat in which China allegedly threatened the Vietnamese 
ambassador with military force if Vietnam did not stop drilling. Vietnam, 
wary of its economic dependence on China as well as uncertainty regard-
ing Trump’s commitment to the region, appeared to back down (Hayton 
2017). This event not only undermined political trust between the two 
countries but again exposed the contradictions that exist in Vietnam’s 
relations with China.  
Ideological loyalty means a close relationship with China is inevita-
ble and falls firmly in line with ensuring the regime’s protected values are 
secured (Vu 2014). Economic dependence also means disputes are best 
resolved peacefully. However, as shown above, China is the principal 
threat to Vietnam’s sovereignty. Vietnam’s strategic objectives are to 
foster cooperation, economic development and a peaceful environment 
at the same time as maintaining its territorial integrity. Recent events 
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have brought home the importance of a multidirectional foreign policy 
and there is no doubt that Vietnam wishes to cooperate with China as 
much as possible, at the same time as emphasising its friendly relations 
with all sides so that its objectives are maintained.  
Ultimately, strategic partnerships are multi-faceted agreements that 
deepen bilateral relations. Similarly, they offer a wide range of benefits 
for Vietnam and its partners, all the way from economic development to 
greater investment opportunities to enhanced security. It is important to 
note that strategic partnerships incorporate defence aspects, defence 
agreements, and areas of security cooperation. These offer Vietnam 
opportunities to boost its capabilities in a non-threatening way, which 
allows Vietnam to pursue its objective of ensuring the protection of its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity without jeopardising its relations with 
China. In fact, since the 12th Party Congress in January 2016, Vietnam 
has identified acceleration of its defensive and security cooperation as 
part of its strategy for integration by 2020 (Vietnam Plus 2016b).  
The diverse array of strategic partnerships means that Vietnam is 
not overly reliant on one particular partner. Carl Thayer stated:  
The purpose of strategic partnerships is to promote comprehen-
sive cooperation across a number of areas and to give each major 
power equity in Vietnam’s stability and development in order to 
ensure Vietnam’s non-alignment and strategic autonomy. (Thayer 
2016c) 
The diversity in its relations also dampens, or at the very least cushions, 
potential uncertainties and potential areas of conflict. Although Donald 
Trump’s election in 2016 cast uncertainty regarding America’s commit-
ment to the region, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc will 
have been reassured by his May, 2017 visit to the White House. The two 
countries issued a joint statement for enhancing the comprehensive 
partnership in which they pledged to:  
Continue high-level contacts and exchanges of delegations, includ-
ing through regular dialogue between the U.S. Secretary of State 
and Vietnam’s Minister for Foreign Affairs to discuss measures to 
enhance the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership. (The White 
House 2017) 
The statement also re-affirmed the importance of FON in addition to 
both countries commitment to resolving territorial disputes peacefully 
and in accordance with international law. Given the ability of strategic 
partnerships to elevate and diversify Vietnam’s bilateral relations, provid-
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ing more autonomy in the process, strategic partnerships represent a 
mechanism of a multidirectional foreign policy.  
Trade Agreements 
Since Doi Moi Vietnam has no longer defined security solely as defend-
ing national sovereignty and territorial integrity, expanding this concept 
to that of comprehensive security to incorporate economic, political and 
social factors as well (Elliot 2012), this has also created social and politi-
cal stability. Since the 2000s Vietnam has experienced impressive growth 
rates, with its GDP usually hovering around 6 per cent (Trading Economics 
2017). This has also led to a significant drop in poverty, with Vietnam 
being frequently touted as a success story for poverty alleviation (The 
World Bank 2013). In 2009, Vietnam became a middle-income country 
with a per capita GDP over USD 1200 (Nguyen 2015). Economic devel-
opment is a core strategic interest for Vietnam and a multidirectional 
foreign policy helps Vietnam to achieve this through trade agreements. 
Vietnam is also keen to avoid becoming economically dependent on one 
country, as it had done during the Cold War, when more than 90 per 
cent of its trade was conducted with the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (Maass 2012). The Ministry of Industry and Trade has 
outlined trade agreements as a “platform to further open to the outside, 
speed up domestic reforms, and serve as an effective approach to inte-
grate into the global economy and strengthen economic cooperation” 
(The Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade 2016). 
Trade deals are a key component of fostering integration, cooperation, 
and promoting economic growth. They have had and will continue to 
have a significant impact on Vietnam’s development, which will, in turn, 
contribute towards Vietnamese strategic goals (Abbott, Bentzen, and 
Finn 2009).  
In recent years, Vietnam has put into place numerous bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements. This demonstrates that Vietnam has ac-
tively and consistently pursued trade agreements that reap significant 
economic benefits and act as a mechanism for pursuing a multidirection-
al foreign policy. Vietnam’s largest trading partner is currently China, 
with trade in 2015 valued at approximately USD 95 billion (Vietnam Net 
2016). China is also Vietnam’s most important trading partner, given its 
geostrategic location and pure economic size. Since the ASEAN-China 
FTA was signed in 2000, imports from China have risen from 7.3 per 
cent to 30 per cent of total imports, and exports have risen from 7.4 per 
cent to 11 per cent of total exports (Vietnam Country Profile 2017). 
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Vietnam relies heavily on China for the import of the cheap raw materi-
als that contribute to Vietnam’s vibrant textile industries. Worryingly, as 
the vast gap in growth between exports and imports to China shows, 
Vietnam’s trade deficit with China has grown remarkably in recent years. 
For example, it reached USD 32.3 billion in 2015 (Tuoi Tre 2016).  
The lop-sided nature of Vietnam–China trade relations exposes Vi-
etnam to potential unfair trading practices and gives China considerable 
economic influence over Vietnam (Pham QM 2014). Vietnam does not 
want to repeat the mistake it made during the Cold War of becoming 
economically overly dependent on one power. In line with its multidirec-
tional foreign policy, Vietnam is developing trade agreements with other 
countries to reduce its dependence on China, most notably the US, Japan, 
South Korea, the EU, Russia, and Central Asian states.  
Table 2.  Vietnam’s Current Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Trading Partners Nature of Agreement Status of Agreement 
as of December 2016 
Chile Free trade agreement Signed and in effect 
Japan Economic partnership 
agreement 
Signed and in effect 
South Korea Free trade agreement Signed and in effect 
The Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (12 members) 
Regional trade agree-
ment 
Signed but not in effect 
(ratification unlikely) 
The Eurasian Customs 
Union (Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia) 
Free trade agreement Signed and in effect 
EU Free trade agreement Signed but not in effect 
Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (16 
members 
Regional trade agree-
ment 
Negotiations ongoing 
The European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) 
Free trade agreement Negotiations ongoing 
Israel Free trade agreement Negotiations ongoing 
Note:  This table originally appears in the cited source but has been updated by the 
author.  
Source:  Sally 2013. 
During the 2000s, Vietnam’s most significant trade agreement was the 
US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, which came into force in 2001 
(Office of the United States Trade Representative 2000). After five years, 
the amount of trade between the two countries increased significantly, 
diversified Vietnam’s exports, and helped pave the way for complete 
integration when it joined the WTO in 2007. Unfortunately for Vietnam, 
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the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is essentially a 
dead deal given the US’s withdrawal shortly after Donald Trump’s inau-
guration. Vietnam was potentially one of the biggest winners from the 
TPP. This 12-bloc trade deal would have offered a host of benefits for 
Vietnam, such as significantly boosting exports, particularly for the 
clothing industry, and would have helped enforce much-needed structur-
al changes to state-owned enterprises while boosting Vietnam–US trade 
relations (Bourdreau 2015). In September 2016, Vietnamese Minister for 
Planning and Investment Nguyen Chi Dung urged outgoing President 
Obama to ratify the agreement, showing how important a deal it was to 
Vietnam (Potkin 2016).  
Vietnam currently has a trade surplus with the US in excess of USD 
32 billion (Lawder 2017). Even after Trump’s election, however, Vi-
etnam took the diplomatic initiative to negate any potential backlash 
from Trump’s bellicose statements regarding countries holding a large 
trade surplus with the US. Vietnam utilised a Washington lobbying firm 
to seek numerous pathways to Trump, setting up a phone call between 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Trump a month before the new president took 
office and sending the Foreign Minister Pham Binh Ming on a trip to 
Washington in April 2017 where he met with Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson (Nguyen Mai 2017). Similarly, trade featured heavily on Nguyen 
Xuan Phuc’s May visit to Washington, with the two countries affirming 
their commitment to promoting bilateral trade.  
Nguyen Xuan Phuc has indicated that TPP or not, Vietnam will 
continue on its path towards increased economic integration and that 
other trade agreements remain strategically in place (Nguyen 2016). In 
the months since Trump’s withdrawal, there has been vocal support for 
the TPP to go ahead without the US (Tomiyama 2017). However, Ha-
noi’s response has been mixed; they are reluctant to move ahead without 
participation from the US, but Vietnam is continuing to proactively en-
gage with the members of the TPP process. In September 2017, minis-
ters from the 11 remaining countries agreed to put in place the prepara-
tory work by November 2017 so they could meet on the sidelines of the 
APEC summit being hosted in Vietnam (Rowley 2017). Regardless, Vi-
etnam has various trade agreements in place that will supplement any 
failure of TPP. In fact, Vietnam is a member of the 16-country Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP member states 
account for roughly 3.4 billion people and have a combined GDP of 
USD 21.4 trillion (Ribka and Yulisman 2016). Negotiations are ongoing 
and likely to continue for the foreseeable future, leading to greater re-
gional integration.  
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The EU and Vietnam have pushed ahead with their efforts to put 
together an FTA, which was achieved in December 2015. Ratification is 
due in 2017 and implementation scheduled for 2018. The EU is Vi-
etnam’s second-largest export market, with exports increasing from 5.59 
per cent in 2005 to 29.9 per cent of total exports in 2015 (Delegation of 
the European Union to Vietnam 2016). The trade agreement will elimi-
nate 99 per cent of all tariffs, along with containing strict rules of origins 
to allay fears of China using Vietnam as a conduit. In tandem with this, 
Vietnam and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have been 
holding negotiations to establish an FTA, with the 13th round of negotia-
tions taking place in October 2015. The EFTA has indicated its willing-
ness to recognise Vietnam’s market economy status. Currently, WTO 
members are not required to recognise Vietnam as a market economy, 
and therefore reserve the right to subject Vietnam to temporary trade 
barriers (Vietnam-EFTA Joint Study Group 2011). The conferring of 
market economy status onto Vietnam would bring about significant 
trade benefits as well as prestige.  
The Vietnam EU-FTA does include a clause on human rights. 
However, with Vietnamese leaders being hostile to accusations of human 
rights abuses from the EU and generally dismissive of the EU normative 
power to influence this, there is little perceived threat to domestic inter-
ference (Hoang 2016). It is also worth mentioning that this is not the 
first time the EU has included a human rights clause in a trade deal with 
Vietnam. Despite much reluctance from Hanoi, the 1995 EU-Vietnam 
Comprehensive Framework Agreement contained Vietnam’s first bilat-
eral treaty to include human rights. The inclusion came about largely due 
to its political clout, much of which has been on the wane in recent years 
given the Euro Crises, Brexit and the rise of Eurosceptic parties across 
Europe (Maass 2012). This is not to say that human rights could not be a 
sticking point. In fact, Vietnam’s heavy-handed response to political 
dissidents since the 12th Party Congress in 2016 has raised the eyebrows 
of the EU parliament, and human rights groups, which have lobbied to 
reject the deal (Hutt 2017).  
Similarly, diplomatic relations with Germany – arguably the most 
influential member of the EU – took a turn for the worse in August 
2017. Germany accused the Vietnamese Secret Service of abducting 
Trinh Xuan Thanh, a former Petro Vietnam Official who fled to Ger-
many after being charged in connection with causing USD 150 million in 
losses at the state-owned enterprise. Thanh later appeared on Vietnam-
ese TV proclaiming he had come back by his own will but Germany still 
demanded his return (BBC 2017). If true, this brazen violation of Ger-
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man and international law might not have the power to completely derail 
the Vietnam–EU FTA but it could certainly strengthen the anti-human 
rights discourse within EU member states.  
Still, multidirectionalism is designed to increase autonomy through 
diversity; therefore, much like the TPP, the EU–Vietnam agreement is 
not the be-all-and-end-all trade deal. Japan and Vietnam agreed on an 
Economic Partnership Agreement in December 2008 and it came into 
force in October 2009 (Vietnam Customs 2013). This Economic Part-
nership boosted cooperation in goods, services, investment, business 
climate improvement, and technical transfer. This agreement also agreed 
to exempt taxes on 92 per cent of the goods exchanged between the two 
countries after coming into force. Since the partnership was signed, the 
amount of Japanese investment into Vietnam has steadily increased with 
transportation equipment and electric machinery for the manufacturing 
centre being two of the largest areas of investment. Vietnamese garment 
industries have also benefited immensely from access to the Japanese 
market, contributing to Vietnam’s rising trade surplus with Japan. The 
2013 trade surplus stood at USD 1.8 billion (Vietnam News 2014). Alt-
hough certain technical barriers to trade do exist, and some Vietnamese 
products do not satisfy Japanese safety requirements, Vietnam–Japan 
trade relations have benefited immensely from their Economic Partner-
ship Agreement. With further tariffs scheduled to be cut during the peri-
od 2015–2019, more benefits will ensue that greatly contribute to Vi-
etnam’s economic development and its economic vitality.  
South Korea and Vietnam signed an FTA in May 2015; the treaty 
was ratified by both countries’ domestic legislatures and came into force 
in December of the same year. This trade agreement will boost trade and 
cooperation between the two countries. Trade between them stood at 
USD 28 billion in 2014 (Vietnam News 2015a). The FTA will increase the 
competitiveness of Vietnamese exports to South Korea significantly. The 
trade deal will also work towards cooperation in the following areas: 
tariff elimination and reduction, investment, intellectual property, cus-
toms facilitation, trade safeguards, technical barriers to trade, e-com-
merce, competition, and institutional and economic cooperation (Tuoi 
Tre 2015). Given that South Korea is constantly one of the top three 
investors in Vietnam, the liberalising of trade between the two countries 
will assist Vietnam’s economic development considerably.  
After eight years of negotiation, the Vietnam-Eurasia Economic 
Union Free Trade Agreement (VN-EAEU FTA) was signed on 29 May 
2015 (WTO 2016). This trade agreement set a USD 10 billion trade tar-
get and will significantly bolster Vietnam’s nascent automobile industry, 
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increase cooperation in the oil sector, and stimulate Russian investment 
into the country. Much has changed since Vietnam relied almost entirely 
on Soviet assistance during the Cold War. By 1996, Russian investment 
into Vietnam had fallen to one-tenth of what it used to be. Trade gradu-
ally picked up during the 2000s and hit the USD 1 billion mark in 2005 
(Mazyrin 2012). Still, trade between the two countries in 2015 represent-
ed only USD 4 billion, a meagre amount compared to Vietnam’s larger 
trading partners outlined above (Asia Times 2016). This trade agreement 
will seek to rectify the lack of Russian investment in Vietnam and 
ASEAN in general. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has even 
touted the Vietnam EEU as a “pilot project for Russian trade liberalisa-
tion between Russia and ASEAN and adds that Vietnam can act as a 
bridge to ASEAN” (Tsvetov 2016). Vietnam–Russian trade relations, in 
addition to relations in general, look set to grow and given Russia’s “piv-
ot to the East,” Vietnam can be a leading facilitator in boosting further 
integration.  
Global and regional powers are not the only countries that Vietnam 
has sought trade agreements with. The Vietnam–Chile FTA came into 
force in January 2014. Vietnam’s first FTA with a Latin American coun-
try entails provisions on facilitating market access, rules of origin, sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers, etc. Vietnam’s textile 
industry, which represented export revenue of USD 18 billion in 2015, 
received an immediate boost from this agreement after textile exports to 
Chile received an instant tariff removal (Vietnam Trade Promotion 
Agency 2017). Other areas that received a tariff cut include seafood, 
coffee, tea, computers, and computer components. Chile could potential-
ly be the first point of access for Vietnam into a much wider Latin-
American market (World Trade Organization Center Vietnam 2011). 
Vietnam is also currently in negotiations to sign an FTA with Israel 
(Embassy of Israel in Vietnam 2016), with first round of negotiations 
held in March 2016. Trade between the two countries stood at USD 1.7 
billion in 2015. 
Since Vietnam monumentally became a WTO member in January 
2007, trade deals have become a prominent part of Vietnam’s proactive 
integration effort. Trade deals bring a host of economic benefits for 
Vietnam and help it achieve its development goals, provide boosts to its 
nascent industries, and increase investment into the country. Similarly, 
trade deals help offset the large trade deficit that Vietnam has accumulat-
ed with China during the past century. Importantly, however, they com-
plement Vietnam’s strong economic relationship with China rather than 
supplement it. Trade deals significantly diversify Vietnam’s economic 
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outlook, helping it develop further and also preventing it from being 
overly reliant on any one particular economy for its development. Fur-
thermore, a diverse approach to trade agreements can alleviate the po-
tential problems of normative pressure stemming from trade deals asso-
ciated with the US and EU. Given the enhanced diversity, vast economic 
benefits, and ability to prevent Vietnam from being subject to unfair 
trading practices, trade deals play a prominent role in Vietnam’s multidi-
rectional foreign policy.  
Multilateralism 
Foreign and Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam Pham Binh Minh has 
stated that multilateralism deserves to “have a higher place” among Viet-
namese foreign policy, adding that “growing globalisation and the emer-
gence of challenges on a global scale has fostered a greater need for 
countries, both large and small, to put into place multilateral framework” 
(Thanh Nien News 2016). Multilateralism bolsters Vietnam’s voice in in-
ternational affairs, wins it vital political support, and contributes to the 
peaceful management of disputes, as well as bringing various economic 
benefits that contribute to the development of the country. Vietnam’s 
multilateral approach extends into participation in various multilateral 
organisations. In this section I will focus on Vietnam’s role in ASEAN, 
its enhanced contributions to the UN, its role as APEC Chair, and its 
participation in the Shangri-La Dialogue. Therefore, multilateralism is a 
key mechanism of a multidirectional foreign policy.  
It is clear that enhanced participation within ASEAN has enabled 
Vietnam to gain strength in numbers and enhance its capabilities to 
hedge against China, while also strengthening its proactive and diverse 
approach to multilateralisation. Evidence of Vietnam’s enhanced and 
proactive role within ASEAN came in its 2010 Chairmanship of ASEAN. 
During this time, Vietnam also successfully hosted the association’s 
major meetings, including the inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers’ – 
Plus Eight Meeting, as discussed below. In addition, it received numer-
ous high-level visits from its Asian partners – Japan, South Korea, and 
China – as well as the United States. In particular, the visit of Secretary 
of State Hilary Clinton in 2010 marked the beginning of the US pivot 
back to Asia with Vietnam and its ASEAN partners playing a fundamen-
tal role. Also, during its 2010 chairmanship, Vietnam hosted the six-
teenth ASEAN summit meeting entitled “Towards the ASEAN com-
munity: From Vision to Action,” which signalled ASEAN’s intent to 
forge a close-knit political-security, economic, and socio-cultural com-
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munity. This plan of action came to fruition in 2015 with the launch of 
the ASEAN Community in December 2015. This has strengthened soli-
darity amongst members, deepened Vietnam’s continued successful inte-
gration into the organisation, and given both ASEAN and Vietnam a 
stronger voice, particularly in their dealings with China (Tran 2015). For 
example, Vietnam has been an active member of the annual ASEAN 
Chiefs of Navy Meetings, which focuses on fostering cooperation 
amongst interoperability among ASEAN Navies.  
At the heart of the ASEAN community is an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area. The economic importance of ASEAN is vital for Vietnam as it 
attempts to reduce its dependence on China and seek diversification in 
its economic partnerships. ASEAN represents approximately 15 per cent 
of both imports and exports for the Vietnamese economy (The ASEAN 
Secretariat 2014). Additionally, with predictions that ASEAN GDP will 
surpass that of Japan in 2030, there are many economic benefits in addi-
tion to the political and security ones (Kikuchi and Lee 2016). On 22 
November 2015, ASEAN formally established the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) as part of its ASEAN Community initiative, focused 
around four pillars: 
1. A single market and production base,  
2. A highly competitive economic region,  
3. A region of equitable economic development,  
4. A region fully integrated into the global economy. (Dosch 2016) 
An ADB report assessing the progress prior to the formations of the 
AEC stipulated that ASEAN has enjoyed successes in lowering tariffs, 
liberalising investment and capital flows through signing the Compre-
hensive Investment Agreement in 2012, strengthening intellectual prop-
erty rights via the ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan 
2011–2015, and signing a number of FTAs that signalled ASEAN’s fur-
ther integration into the global economy. However, the report noted that 
considerable room for improvement exists, particularly in reducing non-
tariff barriers, promoting migrant workers’ rights and reducing their 
labour movement restrictions, fostering greater cooperation amongst 
members, and reducing the development gap that has constantly plagued 
ASEAN throughout its history (Balboa and Wignaraja 2014). In general, 
an ASEAN economic community has the potential to create a deeply 
integrated and highly cohesive ASEAN economy that could support 
sustained high economic growth and resilience, even in the face of global 
economic shocks and volatility. It would bring considerable economic 
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benefits to Vietnam and help alleviate the lop-sided nature of Vietnam–
China trade. 
Vietnam remains committed to the peaceful management of dis-
putes in the South China Sea, in compliance with UNCLOS, utilising 
bilateral channels for disputes between two parties, and multilateral 
channels when disputes involve a third party. ASEAN has provided 
Vietnam with greater collective diplomatic power in managing the issue, 
both with China and with claimant states within ASEAN (Shoji 2011). 
Vietnam became a member of the inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum in 
1994 before joining ASEAN in 1995. Despite its latecomer status, Vi-
etnam quickly integrated into the ASEAN community and has become a 
dynamic member. Its membership is considered a “turning point” in 
Vietnam’s perception of the region and how it viewed the world (Pham 
2011).  
In November 2002, ASEAN and China agreed the Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which strategically com-
mitted both ASEAN and China towards a peaceful solution that incor-
porates the principles of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(ASEAN-People’s Republic of China 2002). However, China has largely 
ignored calls to establish a more binding commitment that restrains and 
binds China from taking unilateral action in the South China Sea. The 
need for a binding code of conduct has intensified since 2009 as Chinese 
assertiveness has increased.  
Nevertheless, throughout the 2000s ASEAN successfully imple-
mented a series of “dominance denial acts” that prevented a rising China 
from asserting its dominance over the organisation, with the added aim 
of hedging against Chinese behaviour (Kuik 2016). These acts included 
the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand into the East Asian 
Summit that began in 2005 with the blessings of Japan. The summit was 
enlarged to include Russia and the US from the sixth summit in 2011, 
with the US and Russia first participating as guests when Vietnam hosted 
the fifth Summit in October 2010.  
Additionally, China had long been pushing for a China-ASEAN de-
fence minister meeting (ADMM) but ASEAN resisted such overtures 
and instead created the ADMM Plus Eight, which included Australia, 
China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the United 
States. Vietnam hosted the inaugural ADMM-Plus Eight meeting in 
October 2010 with the objectives of enhancing regional peace and stabil-
ity, promoting mutual trust, and contributing to the realisation of an 
ASEAN security community. Still, the China-ADMM has been held 
informally on the sidelines of the ADMM Plus Eight since 2011 (Singa-
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pore Minister of Defense 2016). Additionally, the US has hosted two 
Defence Forums with ASEAN Defence Ministers. The inaugural US-
ASEAN Defense Forum was held in April 2014 in Honolulu after then-
US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel extended an invitation at the 2013 
Shangri-La Dialogue. China certainly made note of this; in October 2015 
it hosted a China-ASEAN Informal Defense Ministers’ Meeting for the 
first time in China. At this meeting, China put forth a five-point proposal 
to boost security and defence cooperation between the two sides 
(Parameswaran 2015). October 2016 also saw a US-ASEAN Defense 
Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Honolulu (Parameswaran 2016). The 
simultaneity of these events is worth noting as ASEAN attempts to 
deepen security cooperation with major powers.  
The hedging strategy of ASEAN has led to minor breakthroughs in 
the organisation’s attempts to peacefully manage the South China Sea 
dispute and establish a code of conduct there. The ASEAN Regional 
Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) – China meeting in Tianjin in July 2015 
saw the establishment of a hotline between their respective foreign min-
isters in order to quickly and smoothly handle disputes. More recently, 
progress has been made in setting up a code of conduct (COC) in the 
South China Sea, with China indicating its willingness to negotiate one 
since mid-2016 (Thayer 2016a). Following this, China set a deadline for 
mid-2017 for drafting a framework COC, something that was completed 
ahead of schedule. In August, China and ASEAN agreed to adopt the 
framework at the ASEAN Plus 1 meeting in Manila (ASEAN 2017). 
Although question marks remain regarding whether the COC will be 
legally binding, the framework will serve as the basis for formal discus-
sions, expected in November 2017 after the ASEAN Plus China Summit 
meeting.  
As part of its efforts to be a more proactive member of the UN, Vi-
etnam set up a Peacekeeping Centre in February 2014 to coordinate, 
train, and evaluate peacekeeping missions. Shortly after the centre was 
founded, and for the first time in the country’s history, Vietnam sent 
officials to participate in a UN internal peacekeeping mission in South 
Sudan (Tuoi Tre 2014). In March 2015, Deputy Minister of National De-
fence General Nguyen Chi Vinh led a Vietnamese delegation to the first 
ever United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference at the United Na-
tion’s headquarters in New York. Hervé Ladsous, UN Secretary General 
for Peacekeeping Operations, noted Vietnam’s determination to join 
peacekeeping operations (Vietnamese Embassy in Australia 2015). At the 
same event, Vietnam’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassa-
dor Nguyen Phuong Nga, registered Vietnam for UNSAS, a two-way 
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information sharing system that educates member states and the UN 
about resources, information, and financial situations in order to 
smoothly facilitate peacekeeping operations.  
By 2017 the number of officers sent on peacekeeping missions had 
grown to 12, with Vietnam eager to increase the number to 19 by 2018. 
In fact, the UN has allocated two new positions for Vietnam, allowing 
one intelligence analyst officer and one military observer to join opera-
tions in the Central African Republic as part of Vietnam’s attempts to 
deepen its involvement in peacekeeping operations (Phuong Hoang 
2017). Vietnam hopes to set up a field hospital in South Sudan by early 
2018. Vietnam has also worked closely with bilateral partners to organise 
workshops and training for its officers to bolster their skills and prepara-
tion for future engagement in peacekeeping operations. In November 
2015, Vietnam and France organised a two-day conference to share their 
experiences in the UN Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, the British 
Council has been providing English training to Vietnamese peacekeeping 
officers as part of the Defence Cooperation Memorandum of Under-
standing between Vietnam and the UK (British Embassy Hanoi 2014). 
Meanwhile, Vietnam and China signed an MoU on Peacekeeping Coop-
eration in April 2015 aimed at stimulating further collaboration between 
the two armies, with numerous meetings on peacekeeping cooperation 
being held since (Thayer 2016c). 
Vietnam has ultimately shown its willingness to proactively engage 
in UN peacekeeping missions. Its intentions have been backed up by 
concrete measures, with further deepened cooperation likely. Additional-
ly, Vietnam was elected as a member of the UN Human Rights Council, 
the UN Economic and Social Council for the second time in its history, 
the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
serves as a member of the UNESCO Executive Board (2015–2019), and 
is seeking to become a member of the UN Security Council in 2020–
2021 (Vietnamese Government Portal 2014).  
The APEC region represents a vast amount of Vietnam’s foreign 
trade; 80 per cent of FDI comes from APEC countries and Vietnam’s 
trade with APEC countries totalled around USD 146 billion in 2016 
(Phuong Ha 2017). After joining APEC in 1998, Vietnam has achieved 
substantial economic growth and, since 2006, began to be a more active 
member of the organisation. In 2006 Vietnam was the APEC chair for 
the first time and it successfully hosted the APEC Ministers’ Meeting. 
Since then it has hosted various committee chairmanship positions, such 
as the chairman of the budget and management committee in 2007, vice 
chairman of the health working group between 2009 and 2010 and 
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chairman of the working group on emergency preparedness in 2012–
2013.  
Vietnam will host the APEC leaders meeting in November 2017. As 
chair of the 2017 APEC Summit, Pham Binh Minh attended the 2017 
G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Bonn, Germany. He used the oppor-
tunity to call for the adherence to international law and the promotion of 
multilateralism. He emphasised the need for cooperation in a complex 
world. He stated that, despite Vietnam’s modest resources, it has tried to 
positively contribute towards international organisations, notably the UN 
peacekeeping missions and ASEAN, all of which are keys to peacefully 
resolving disputes (Voice of Vietnam 2017). Minh believes that economic 
growth has put Vietnam in a better position to contribute more to 
APEC and its contributions thus far certainly demonstrate the country’s 
commitment to multilateralism. Being the host of the APEC Summit 
allows Vietnam to demonstrate its commitment to multilateralism and 
gives it a platform for pursuing its political goals (APEC 2016). 
Proactive engagement in regard to security has taken place via the 
Shangri-La Dialogue. This is an inter-governmental security think tank 
forum held annually and attended by defence ministers from over 28 
states. Vietnam obtained full ministerial status in 2009 and has been 
proactively engaged in the organisation ever since. Prime Minister Ngu-
yen Tan Dung gave a keynote address at the opening session of the con-
ference on 31 May 2013 in which he called for the need for “strategic 
trust for the sake of peace, cooperation, and prosperity in the Asian 
region.” He added that countries, whether big or small, must “build their 
relations on the basis of equality and mutual respect and, at a higher level” 
(Nguyen 2013). Ultimately, strategic trust can be fostered through multi-
lateral forums and adherence to international laws and ASEAN’s core 
principle of consensus.  
Exactly one year on from Dung’s Speech, and in the midst of the 
HS-981 incident, Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh ad-
dressed the conference, stating that China must “immediately withdraw 
its drilling rig” and “join talks with Vietnam to maintain peace, stability 
and friendship between the two countries” (Vietnamese Government 
Portal 2014). On the sidelines of the meeting, Thanh also held bilateral 
meetings with counterparts from the UK, France, and the US. The in-
volved parties called for restraint and respect for international law to 
ease the on-going tensions. At the 2017 forum, Deputy Defence Minister 
Nguyen Chi Vinh called on nations to “increase cooperation to settle 
differences and prevent conflicts” (Vietnam News 2016c). Tran Viet Thai 
of the Vietnam Diplomatic Academy claimed that this sends a message 
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that Vietnam conforms to the norms of international law (Vietnam News 
2016a). Meanwhile, on the sidelines of the 2017 forum, US Defense 
Secretary Jim Mattis held a meeting with representatives of ASEAN in 
which they called for greater commitment to the block, particularly 
through the ADMM Plus framework (Vietnam Plus 2017).  
Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy seeks greater engagement 
with the international community, whilst at the same time safeguarding 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to foster national con-
struction. In line with this, Vietnam has sought broader and deeper co-
operation at the multilateral level and has taken proactive steps to do this. 
ASEAN provides Vietnam with a greater political voice vis-à-vis China. 
Meanwhile, it has also taken steps to enhance its engagement with the 
UN, APEC, and the Shangri-La Dialogue to help it achieve its national 
interests. Doing so brings Vietnam political support, economic benefits, 
and eases security concerns. 
Conclusion 
Although a lot has changed over the almost 30 years since Vietnam ini-
tially instigated its multidirectional Foreign Policy, the country’s core 
strategic interests have not. They remain: maintaining a peaceful and 
stable environment, protecting national independence, sovereignty, and 
boosting Vietnam’s position to bolster national construction and defence. 
Political, economic and security measures lie at the heart of these inter-
ests. As the world has become increasingly multipolar and integrated, 
new problems and threats have emerged. Also, the stakes for conflict 
have never been higher. For Vietnam, the aim of the game is to reduce 
uncertainty whilst benefiting from globalisation. A multidirectional for-
eign policy allows the country to mitigate the circumstances of asym-
metry by neither balancing nor bandwagoning. Rather, diverse partner-
ships, enhanced integration, and flexibility allow for states to increase 
gains and minimise the risk of losses without falling into the orbit of a 
larger power.  
Vietnam implements its multidirectional foreign policy through 
three key mechanisms: strategic/comprehensive partnerships, trade deals, 
and multilateralism. The strategic/comprehensive partnerships enhance 
cooperation bilaterally across a wide array of areas with pivotal partners, 
providing economic, political, and security benefits. While not always 
being defence-orientated, a large number of the strategic partnerships 
include defence arrangements that can counter an assertive China. Again, 
the benefits of cooperation are reaped and the risks are managed. Trade 
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deals contribute to Vietnam’s economic development, by bolstering 
national construction, support development goals, increase exports 
abroad, and attract investment into Vietnam. Maintaining a diverse port-
folio of trade agreements also reduces dependence and reduces the eco-
nomic leverage that China maintains over Vietnam. Meanwhile, multilat-
eralism enhances Vietnam’s bargaining power, particularly in relation to 
China, creates greater cohesion amongst ASEAN members, and brings 
immense economic benefits. Being proactive in ASEAN also enables 
Vietnam to safeguard the policy of non-intervention: which provides 
comfort to the regime.  
Vietnam remains committed to ensuring a peaceful international 
environment that allows for cooperation in dealing with today’s highly 
complex, integrated problems, further economic development, and the 
peaceful management of disputes. China’s recent assertiveness has in-
jected greater importance into Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy, 
given the asymmetries that exist in Vietnam–China relations. A multidi-
rectional foreign policy offsets problems associated with such a relation-
ship. Given Vietnam’s strong determination not to be overly reliant on 
any one power or be drawn into a bipolar conflict, it is easy to see why 
Vietnam continues to pursue a multidirectional foreign policy. However, 
challenges still lie ahead. Question marks arise as to whether America is 
fully committed to the region as it was under Barack Obama, particularly 
given the unpredictability of American foreign policy under Donald 
Trump. At the same time, the Philippines has firmly re-orientated itself 
into China’s orbit, along with Malaysia. The on-going problems in the 
Euro-zone have reduced its cohesion and pose significant questions to 
the limits of regionalisation. This makes Hanoi nervous, as it could po-
tentially play into China’s hands. Yet, given that a multidirectional for-
eign policy has served Vietnam so well since it emerged from Doi Moi, 
we should expect little change in the country’s foreign policy any time 
soon.  
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